

► The West African Protected Areas Newsletter

« La Lettre des Aires Protégées en Afrique de l'Ouest »



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EDITO

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The notion of ecosystemic service, established in 2005 by the *Millennium Ecosystem Assessment*, is more and more employed as it helps understand the close relationships between the nature and its social use. The mobilisation of this notion generally leads to the observation that the cost and benefits drawn from ecosystemic services are not enough taken into consideration by public and private stakeholders. On this basis, many prescribers- well beyond the circle of economists- encourage to set a price, a monetary value for ecosystems. The only noticeable exceptions come from a very few actors or searchers who see here insurmountable problems, whether they be ethical or methodological.

From environmental NGOs to enterprises, via international organizations such as UNEP or the World Bank, everybody or almost seem to agree that an “economicization” of the conservation represents at least a part of the solution. In a world which seems to be dominated by the rules of economy and the strength of figures or tables, using the monetary standards to evaluate the services offered by biodiversity and the cost of their destruction seems to be able to encourage change of tendency by offering a proof that economic optimization and choices rationalization are in fact the friends of conservation. The “Economics of Biodiversity” would then enable make an old dream become true: bring biodiversity out of the protected areas’ “ghetto” and start



an informed dialogue "on equal terms" with large economic sectors.

This hypothesis is old: since the 60's at least, calls for the mobilization of the economic analysis to

justify biodiversity conservation have been multiplied, accompanied by a growing activity in this sense. For example, Randall in 1988 declared that « the best way to protect biodiversity is to give to it an economic value ». Today, Pavan Sukhdey, brilliant representative of the international effervescence about the subject, follow him by stating that “the economics of ecosystems and biodiversity can definitely contribute to safeguarding biodiversity”.

But how is this « decisive contribution » supposed to appear? By which mechanisms economic evaluations are they supposed to feed decision processes and reorient them towards more consideration for biodiversity matters? If they are so important, why does such a gap remain between the quasi incantatory calls for the practice of economic evaluations of biodiversity and their real use? The hypothesis is that they generally have a conclusive force, able to overcome the usual obstacles to the preservation of biodiversity. It happens as if the issue of collective action was reduced to a signal in a set of decisions to be made. « Decision-makers » would just be waiting for appropriate information to act in favour of biodiversity. And yet, Claude Henry has proposed in the 80's that microfinance be considered as a language for negotiation rather than a direct tool for decision-making, after showing through many examples that decision was rarely the translation of a calculation. This point of view, « obvious » but surprisingly minority is yet shared by many great economists. Who would moreover pretend that agricultural, fishing or infrastructure policies, with all the



irrationality that often characterize them, are the result of costs-advantages analyses?

This core issue of the real and not fantasized use of economic evaluations seems today orphan in the international research and rarely clear in actors' expressions of interest for the tools provided by economy. It is nonetheless fundamental as far as action is concerned. Iddri has put it at the heart of its thought on biodiversity, for example within the framework of its researches on the Payments for Ecosystemic services. However, what we need is the mobilization of all – moreover the stakeholders

Questioning the theory of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) in light of emerging experience and plausible developments

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This article is a short extract of a full text that can be downloaded on:

[http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Analyses/Analyse-des-fondements-theoriques-des-Paiements-pour-Services-Environnementaux-\(PSE\)](http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Analyses/Analyse-des-fondements-theoriques-des-Paiements-pour-Services-Environnementaux-(PSE)). Paragraphs which have been deleted are replaced by (...). For more information, please refer to the original article.

Introduction

A need for critical debate

Among the fiercely debated concepts in the field of conservation, that of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES, also called Payments for Environmental Services) is now one of the most prominent. The emergence of PES is concurrent with increased attention to the need to maintain ecosystem services, defined as "services that are provided by ecosystems" by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005). This need arises from the rapid degradation of ecosystems, combined with the general trend for major economic growth in recent decades. While ecosystem services are widely deteriorating – i.e. their "supply" is being reduced – the ability to pay for these services is increasing in line with the pace of global economic growth, which tends to increase and make the "demand" for such services solvent. And although the recent and ongoing economic crisis may affect the ability to pay to some extent, willingness to pay for ecosystem services should continue to rise with legally binding commitments on climate and biodiversity protection in particular.

engaged in concrete decision-making processes on the ground – to ensure that the "economic wave" that reaches the field of conservation today will be welcomed realistically, critically and constructively. The field of conservation has already most often relied on supposedly new approaches which were abandoned a few years later because they turned out to be disappointing. It is imperative that, from now, we make the effort to take advantage of the different levers we have, whether they belong or not to the economic science.

Enjoy the reading!

What exactly is a PES scheme? The underlying principle is based on contractual payments to users of a natural resource, such payments being subject to the condition that they maintain a pre-defined environmental service. This straightforward principle is elaborated in a definition by Wunder (2005), which continues to provide a reference today. This definition indicates that PES are (i) a voluntary transaction, by which (ii) a well-defined environmental service (iii) is being "bought" by at least one buyer (iv), from at least one provider (v) if - and only if - the service is actually preserved (conditionality). We henceforth adopt this terminology, where the "provider", as the user of a resource, is susceptible to receive a payment for the maintenance or restoration of an associated ecosystem service, while the "buyer" is the beneficiary of this service.

It therefore appears that the PES concept has been well defined. The boundaries of the instrument seem to be clearly characterized by the presence of a voluntary agreement involving a payment for an established and previously approved result. Its undeniable popularity certainly relates to the fact that it seems to follow an inexorable logic: the internalization of environmental services to attract additional funding makes conservation profitable and financially sustainable through the mutual interest of both parties. More precisely, the success of the PES concept is based on the presumed validity of the simplicity-equity-efficiency triptych: its simplicity and efficiency are related to the limited number of stakeholders involved in the transaction, and the fact that the instrument addresses the problem head on. Moreover, the PES tool is able to induce changes in land use without touching on sensitive land tenure issues, as we observe in practice that resource users without formal rights may receive payments as well. This flexibility is believed to make PES more efficient, i.e. a more cost-effective and less politically risky option than alternative conservation strategies. Equity is related to the voluntary nature of the transaction, the economic value of which is in principle the result of transparent negotiations. In addition, the emergence of PES in the field of conservation has provided interesting results due to their rapid development. In particular it seems to have shifted, sometimes dramatically, the borders between local development promoters and conservation advocates. Indeed PES combine to some extent the participatory

approach (primacy of the process) with the pragmatism of financial compensation (results based management and direct incentives).
(...)

A profusion of unresolved questions

The rapid emergence of PES has indeed been built on the foundation of a somewhat hasty consensus based on the merits of these payments. In some instances, where authors have explicitly referred to some of the problems raised, it seems that the appropriate lessons have not truly been learned. (...)

The aim of this document is therefore clear: to stimulate a debate which, in our opinion, has been too lethargic. The intention is to participate in this debate in a constructive manner in order to improve understanding of the mechanisms at work and ultimately to improve the real contribution of PES to conservation efforts. (...)

There are several major areas that deserve further exploration. First, despite its very precise definition, the PES concept opens the floodgates to an extremely diverse array of interpretations. Indeed, the nature of the two contracting parties (provider and buyer) is undefined, which leaves significant room for manoeuvre to involve the State, the private sector, landowners, concessionaires, and individuals who, legally or *de facto*, control a resource. Furthermore, we notice that the term "payment" may be interpreted more widely than the payment of a monetary amount, to include other types of "rewards". (...)

Moreover, the simplicity-equity-efficiency triptych is definitely not as clear as it seems. The simplicity and (therefore?) efficiency of PES tends to deflect attention away from the nevertheless crucial issue of the long term: in principle, only the symptoms and not the causes of environmental degradation are addressed.

The possibility of achieving equity is particularly undermined by the aforementioned question about the respective natures of service providers and buyers, and whether or not they are taken into account when calculating the payment amount. Thus, although initially established to benefit poor rural populations, or at least those with low investment capacities, the instrument is also increasingly applied to prosperous private contractors on public land. This raises the question of whether this goes against the polluter pays principle, in spirit and in practice. Are we not actually rejecting the funding of necessary changes to the development trajectory, to the benefit of massive financial support for "professional" providers, under the pretext of efficiency? (...)

Seven key questions about PES

Since the aim of this article is not to address all the dimensions of the broader issues mentioned above, we propose to focus on seven aspects:

- How are services assessed and what links are maintained between PES and economic valuations? With what kind of consequences?
- Why is the nature of the service providers (users of the resource) not neutral?

- Why does the nature of the buyer (service beneficiaries) also matter?
- How should the issue of the long-term implementation of PES be considered?
- How should changes to the geographical scale of PES (up-scaling) be considered?
- What links do contract-type instruments such as PES maintain with public legislation and authorities?
- Is the environmental efficiency of PES enhanced by the involvement of industrial and commercial actors?

The analyses that follow for each of these questions are based first and foremost on the concept of PES as defined in literature. We compare this with various elements from the theory of economics, public action and environmental management, from emerging practices as we observe them in the field, as well as from future developments of this mechanism that we consider plausible for various reasons.

The limited usefulness of economic valuations and its consequences

PES are associated with the principle of purchasing an environmental service. Perhaps because their development is part of the same international dynamic as the recent return to the limelight of the economic valuation of biodiversity and ecosystem services, and because carbon storage is (wrongly) assumed to have a clear value due to the existence of carbon markets, it is often thought that agents who benefit from a service pay the equivalent value of that service. However, this reasoning, which calls for more economic valuations, is debatable for at least two reasons.

The highly uncertain value of ecosystem services

Firstly – a fact that no one denies –, estimating the economic value of ecosystem services is often difficult, sometimes almost impossible, and always subject to a wide margin of error and subjective assumptions, even when limited to the use value. Some of the many sources of uncertainty are listed below:

- The option value (related to the potential and future use of the service) is rarely known at the time of the evaluation.
- Local uses of biodiversity are often favored, as is the case with ranking methods for priority use (but without quantification of the value)

(...)

The value of a service depends on the number of beneficiaries taken into account, and apart from emblematic examples – a spring used for bottled mineral water, or the flow of a river allowing hydropower generation – the beneficiaries of environmental services are generally more dispersed and therefore less easily identified or mobilized than implied by the PES concept. This may result in a tendency to underestimate their value.

A monetary value that is not particularly useful...

Not only is it difficult to imagine a scenario where two agents easily agree on an estimated value that has such a

large margin of error, but other considerations also put into perspective the usefulness of the economic valuation of ecosystem services for PES implementation.

First, from an ecological perspective, the real contribution of biodiversity or other elements of the ecosystem to the provision of a given service is often highly uncertain. (...)



Most cost-benefit analyses performed by conservation NGOs do not consider the impacts of gradual environmental changes on the economic value of the service. Thus, even in a hypothetical situation

where we know the precise value of a service, it does not necessarily follow that we also know which conclusions to draw regarding requirements of the state of the ecosystem; conditions which buyers must negotiate with providers in order to maintain this service.

Logically, one might actually expect payment amounts to be based mainly on the opportunity cost, that is to say the cost for the users of not exploiting a resource, or to exploit it less or differently and thus preserve or restore an environmental service. The logic then shifts from one of demand (obtaining services) to one of supply (sacrifice of revenue). While this would appear to simplify the calculation, significant methodological problems nonetheless arise: the opportunity cost is an economic concept which is as simple to explain as it is complex to estimate. The chosen calculation methods can greatly influence the results. (...)

The perception of the opportunity costs by recipients is also crucial, and there is no guarantee that this will be similar to the economic calculation carried out by external experts or by service beneficiaries (...)

Finally, following economic rationality, we can consider that the value of the ecosystem service and the opportunity cost for the non-degradation of this service are, respectively, the maximum that the buyer is willing to pay for a continued service, and the minimum the provider may accept to receive in exchange for his change in behavior. In practice, these values, as we have seen, are very uncertain – stakeholders frequently do not recognize or understand them – and therefore the transfer amount at stake in a PES is essentially the result of a negotiation. This means that asymmetries of power and information play a key role, which strongly downplays the role of economic evaluation.

Far from bringing objectivity and mechanical interactions to the traditional conservation and development nexus, it leaves stakeholders in a situation where power struggles, government and governance issues are central.

The nature of buyers and sellers

The two main stakeholders in a PES scheme are obviously the buyer and seller of a given service. (...)

The nature of the buyer depends on the service and implies specific PES modalities

Environmental services must be separated into at least two categories: local or private utility services; and those of global, and therefore public utility. Although united under the same term and the same instrument, these two service types in fact have characteristics that make them fundamentally different. (...)

In a situation where a service is of local or private utility, the buyer is limited, identifiable, and aims to maintain the benefit that results from the service. Assuming that the provider shares these characteristics, the two contracting parties may conduct negotiations to reach an agreement on the condition that in principle the buyer has the financial means to offer payments that are at least equal to the opportunity costs of the provider. The intervention of the public authorities is then relevant only to enforce laws or to provide an institutional framework capable of promoting this type of agreement. (...)

Where a service depends on a public good, especially a global public good such as climate, the world's population can potentially be considered as the buyer; therefore achieving an agreement cannot be immediately accomplished through negotiations between the two contracting parties. For this type of good of public value, alternative forms of negotiation must be sought, for example through interfacing with the market (which is then responsible for assigning a value to the service and commercializing it), with the public authority (via an international fund financed by countries representing the beneficiary population), or through other channels.

The nature of the seller is critical for equity issues

PES have traditionally been conceived and applied in contexts where the providers of the service were populations (as opposed to industrial companies) – fishermen, "villagers" using a forest, farmers – which has several important implications. Indeed, the financial amounts are usually limited by the size of sites and by the low opportunity costs of relatively poor populations in rural areas. In addition, populations in receipt of payments reside more or less "on site", even if their rights over the resource may be informal (not recognized by the public authorities). This inclination towards poor rural populations is logical for an instrument that leaves the initiative to a buyer whose interest is to best negotiate the provision of an environmental service. (...)

However, given that PES are now applied more widely and presented as a suitable instrument for very contrasting environments, the explicit question of the nature of the service providers must be raised. It is indeed possible that radical changes will occur, and we are seeing the beginnings of this process. In the near future we could thus move from a situation where PES are an emergency solution – to bring a rapid halt to environmental degradation by contractually binding individuals with reduced negotiating power and limited demands in terms of compensation levels – to a situation where the service providers consider these payments as

the result of commercial activity in a portfolio of income generating activities. (...)

Designing PES for immediate gains or longer term changes?

In their conception, the aim of PES is to preserve the environment through payments that are conditional on abandoning degrading activities. It is their simplicity and the direct way in which they address environmental problems that purportedly constitute the basis of their effectiveness. In principle, the instrument is intended to obtain immediate results, whilst the issue of achieving a long-term solution to the problem is not addressed. Indeed, periodic payments reflect a mode of action consisting of removing a threat for as long as payments are maintained. These payments are calculated on the basis of the conditions observed at the time the contract is made, and are potentially subject to future revisions according to diverse parameters: price of agricultural commodities, labor costs, costs of inputs, yields, etc. In principle, the PES therefore consists of an instrument to delay the moment when environmental degradation takes place, but does not structurally remove the possibility of its occurrence. This observation can be regarded positively or negatively: on the one hand, it may be seen as a means to retain flexibility over time, allowing more satisfactory solutions to be found; on the other hand, it can be seen as an incomplete solution to the problem, leaving a sword of Damocles hanging over the situation that will fall once the funds are no longer available or if the contract is broken. (...)

The issue of large-scale implementation of PES: an alternative to reforms?

In parallel to the issue of the sustainability of payments (where the possibility of cessation carries the risk of the future degradation of environmental services), those programs that promote the extension of PES on a large scale through replication of the original blueprint must be regarded with caution. This suggestion is controversial because with necessarily limited financial resources, a crowding-out effect may occur (in the sense that other actions may no longer receive funding). Then again, allowing the belief that the proliferation of PES schemes is a solution to the current problem of massive environmental degradation carries the risk of deflecting attention away from the necessary political choices regarding development trajectories.

The issue of financial resources for the large scale implementation of PES can be considered on at least two levels: (i) where does money come from and in substitution for what? Private financial resources to replace a productive investment, public investment as an alternative to development aid, etc.? (ii) How can we globally account for the loss of production due to the cessation of a productive activity (condition of payments)? It thus appears that large-scale implementation of use-restricting PES could have important repercussions in terms of global well-being.

Consideration must therefore be given to the merits of such an option compared to those involving investments in

alternative activities by taking into account the global costs of either alternative. (...)

Discussion: Drawing red lines to optimize the effects and reduce the risks of PES

The issues raised in the previous sections focus on the risks linked to a large-scale application of PES (through a multiplication of sites) when adhering to their strict definition, which involves the multiplication of financial compensation for users of natural resources (use-restricting PES).

These risks must be taken seriously because the compulsive replication of this model is currently under debate, especially within the framework of the REDD+ mechanism. Its scope of application could therefore cover a major proportion of the forests situated in developing countries, which have carbon stocks that have now become a prime issue. The probability of its large-scale application is even higher if we consider the following two facts:

- The potential development of a market logic applied to forest conservation will clearly result in the development of markets for environmental services – with carbon as the spearhead within REDD+ – which are likely to rely mainly on private investments. According to this reasoning, the investment would be directed primarily towards the direct payment of compensation for agents of deforestation in order to obtain immediate results. (...)
- The funding of results rather than efforts in the fight against deforestation is an incentive to implement a method that allows the quantification of results. In this respect, use restricting PES are readily considered in a positive light, because their results can be assessed as promising when applied in a limited way and if we consider short-term consequences.

The emergence of carbon markets applied to forest conservation is beginning to produce concrete effects on the possible proliferation of PES, which could be applied to private companies operating on public lands and with licences granted by competent public authorities. This apparently surprising scenario is actually quite plausible. (...)

It is particularly important to define this limit for global ecosystem services, derived most notably from biodiversity and carbon stocks. Indeed, initiatives related to PES that aim to preserve these services could stimulate substantial financial flows (particularly large in the case of REDD+) and involve a group of stakeholders ranging from the populations that use the resource to the national or sub-national authorities, through private companies operating on private or public land and international funds or organizations in charge of ordering payments. It is then necessary to agree on rules that will govern these financial flows and on a few basic principles that should be observed. These principles should address the nature of the eligible beneficiaries of PES (populations, private sector, the State), payment terms (periodic, duration,

calculation of the amounts), and the nature of the reward granted (payments, technical support, property rights). (...)

We believe that a promising option to properly and effectively address these risks is to both specify and broaden the PES concept, and to reduce the scope of application when public financing is at stake. It should be possible to systematically go beyond monetary payments and to integrate elements of technical support to encourage changes of practice for productive activities. This would make it possible, *inter alia*, to guarantee that: mobilized financial resources are usefully invested; the relevant agents remain part of the production process; vital environmental conservation does not fall under the sole control of “market logic”; and it also minimizes the risk of wealth hoarding by economic agents who are well-informed and well-connected with political elites.

PES should be designed as a means of guiding production practices in a direction that is desirable both for the environment and for the creation of wealth and revenue. Wunder's definition of PES may be elaborated in this way: PES are (i) a voluntary transaction in order (ii) to preserve or enhance at least one well-defined environmental service, between (iii) at least one provider, (iv) who clearly cannot be subject to the polluter pays principle, (v) and at least one buyer, (vi) who offers a payment over a limited period (vii) as a means for investment in locally productive and sustainable activities.

We call for research to expand the application method for PES, which should explicitly include agricultural issues. This should be made a priority in order to illustrate the urgent and compelling need to extend policies and measures beyond the threatened sites. (...)

Take-home lessons

The analysis we conducted leads us to a number of points we would like to make clear to the reader, keeping in mind that field research will be necessary to test most of these hypotheses.

- There is a strong disconnect between economic valuations of ecosystem services and the design of PES, which is bound to persist.
- The nature of sellers should be subject to debate when it comes to “professional” sellers (not traditional users of the resource) to ensure that making an exception to the polluter pays principle by using PES is justified. The use of PES to persuade commercial actors not to degrade the environment is a dangerous shift towards a “polluter profits principle”.
- The nature of buyers is closely related to the type of service that is provided (for instance local or global public good) and implies specific PES mechanisms; various logics may therefore apply to various services and buyers.
- There are two contrasting approaches to PES, one leading to the cessation of activities (use-restricting) and the other generating changes in practices (asset-building), suggesting that the former would be rather transitory and flexible while the later would create greater needs for investment but better prospects for long-term effectiveness.

- Large-scale implementation of PES (a great number of sites) generates risks of deterring the elaboration and implementation of reforms because of the creation of incentives for rent-seeking behaviour and the use of financial capital for ceasing productive activities.
- From the perspective of law and public policies, PES reverse the polluter pays principle and potentially encourage illegal activities for resource users to claim payments. These points need consideration particularly in developing countries where there is a case for public action to be strengthened in the long term rather than being substituted by private deals.
- The Coase theorem hardly applies to PES because of very substantial transaction costs that impede the multiplication of deals between stakeholders to reach a social optimum. While this could be understood as an argument in favour of “professional” stakeholders including intermediaries (see for instance the carbon market), this trend may eventually generate new costs *inter alia* through profit margins collected in the meantime, and needs to be considered with caution as it carries the risk of unduly reversing the polluter pays principle.

See www.iddri.org

Evaluation of Niger protected areas management effectiveness

In Niger, the Ministry of hydraulics, environment and fight against desertification, particularly the state secretariat for environment is in charge of protected areas management through the Department of wildlife, fishing and fish farming. The park's manager reports to the Director of wildlife, fishing and fish farming (DFPP). An ongoing restructuring aims at creating a ministry in charge of water, environment and fight against desertification which will include the General Department of environment, waters and forests (DGE/EF) composed of 5 national departments. The Department of wildlife, hunting and protected areas (DFC/AP) will specifically be in charge of management of Niger protected areas.

Niger protected areas management effectiveness has been evaluated during a three day workshop organised in Niamey from 30 March to 1st April 2010. Six PAs have been evaluated: Niger W national park, Air Ténéré national reserve, Tamou wildlife reserve, Dosso wildlife reserve, Gadabéji wildlife reserve, and Termit Tin Toumma national reserve. The methodology used is the one developed by WWF - *Rapid Assessment and Prioritization of Protected Areas Management* (RAPPAM) - combined to the protected areas monitoring tool developed by the World Bank and WWF: *Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool* (METT). These methods are based on the evaluation framework developed by the world Commission on Protected Areas (more information on www.papaco.org).

Niger protected areas are representative of most of the country's ecosystems. They are divided up through the Sudan-Sahelian ecosystems and the areas of transition to Saharan ecosystems. These protected areas cover 8.5 millions hectares that is 6.6% of the national land area. However, some sites that still have a high conservation value for key species are not yet integrated to the network (giraffe area, Ayorou area for example).

There are two categories of protected areas in Niger: on the one hand, those which take advantage of external partners support such as the W park, Air Ténéré reserve and Termit future reserve, and on the other hand those which do not benefit from any external funding and which have a low management level (lack of management documents, few or no infrastructures and equipments for daily basic activities).



Often, the inadequacy of the human resources available (lack of staff, insufficiency of appropriate trainings, managers living far from their site), sometimes combined to the climate of insecurity prevailing in some areas, make these Niger protected areas vulnerable to the multiple pressures on them. The most critical pressures come from poaching and illegal use of lands (for pasture, farming, house building); there is also wood and non timber forest products exploitation, uncontrolled wild fires and some factors that modify the milieu (silted-up of rivers and invasive species).

Mining activities around (or sometimes inside) some protected areas (Termit, Air Ténéré, W park) constitute a serious threat in terms of pollution and pressures on water resources as well as a factor of attraction of populations who are likely to increase locally the needs for natural resources.

The following recommendations have been made by the managers who participated to the workshop:

- Update and validate the management plans of PAs when they have one, or elaborate the management plans of those which do not have any
- Establish the legal statute of PAs which do not have it yet
- Define clear and workable conservation objectives for the network and each protected area according to the current state of Niger biodiversity
- Ensure a basic funding of all PAs by the State
- Propose possible scenarios to partners and the State for the sustainable funding of PAs network
- Strengthen PAs managers capacities to use

conservation tools (PAs planning and management tool) and to dialogue with other stakeholders (particularly for involving local communities in management issues)

- Set up effective consultation frameworks among protected areas via the national network of protected areas (to encourage information sharing)
- Strengthen the monitoring of protected areas management and the self-evaluation of the procedures at all levels, to limit procedural errors and to guarantee the transparency of the management of these activities (mainly towards external partners)
- Strengthen the management system of some PAs (particularly by naming a manager for those which don't have)
- Make sure that managers stay at their position for a minimal duration to enable a mid-term monitoring of management actions and make sure that management structures are located the nearest possible of the sites (decentralization)



Literary section

Telling about nature

Welcome in APAO literary section!

Proposed by Thomas Rabeil - Sahara Conservation Fund –Sahelo-saharan Antelopes Program – Niger www.saharaconservation.org

The book of the month «*Rencontres avec l'Archidruide* » from John McPhee is not a new book, as it was first published in 1971. So, why are we talking about it now? Simply because it has just been translated into French, and now available for our French speaking friends! This book tells the fight of a man in the USA, David Brower, who can be considered as the first media conservationist of his time. Through three examples, a mountain, an island and a river, the author brings us in a naturalist drive with a skilled style both narrative and journalistic. In the book, the American paradox vis-à-vis the environment transpires throughout the pages. Obsessed by the need for economic growth and aware of the necessity to protect areas of unique beauty, America hovers between the two and, as underlined by the author, takes two steps backwards each time it takes one forwards! Unable to ratify the treaties and/or environmental protocols for fear to endanger its “*American way of life*”, America has yet been the first nation to create a protected area, Yellowstone in 1872. This book may seem obsolete on some aspects as it was written 40 years ago, but at least it replaces us face to a frightening reality: what have we done over the past forty years to conserve our planet? It will be up to the readers to decide...

The book is available on the internet at http://www.gallmeister.fr/livre?livre_id=488

Job offer/ consultation

GTZ invitation to tender for the definition of a policy and a research development plan at ICCN

Within the framework of the partnership GTZ/ICCN and its biodiversity maintenance and sustainable forest management programme (PBF), the Congolese institute for the conservation of nature (ICCN), created on 21st April 1925 and declared public institution by the decree n°10/15 of 10 April 2010, aims at conserving nature and protected areas *in* and *ex situ*.

In its biodiversity conservation strategy, ICCN has a strategic programme related to the promotion of research which specific objective is to formulate the policy and elaborate a research development plan. ICCN already has a research policy and development plan written in 2004. It is important that this document be updated, its strengths and weaknesses analyzed and current environmental challenges (adaptation to climate change, etc.) integrated. As detailed in the TORs, the consultant will have to :

- Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of ICCN draft development plan
- Propose a work method and strategic orientations to the DG/ICCN team in view of adapting this document to the current context.
- Provide advice and support to the writing of the final document
- Propose funding and sharing sources likely to contribute to the implementation of ICCN research development plan
- Initiate contacts between ICCN and potential partners (at least 3)

The tender package composed of the terms of reference, the offers notation grid and the agreement general conditions applicable to GTZ can be drawn at **Bureau GTZ à Kinshasa, 7, Avenue Comité Urbain, Kinshasa-Gombe, République Démocratique du Congo** every working day from 1st to 30th September 2010 or requested by email at the following address: anaclat.wula@gtz.de

Consultation duration: 16 days (trip exclusive) on 15th November 2010 at the latest.

Bids deposit ;

CVs should be sent at **Bureau GTZ** or sent by email at : gtz-kongo-rdc@gtz.de

Bids should be sent no later than 15th October 2010 at 16:00.

FIBA Monitoring and evaluation officer

The **Fondation Internationale du Banc d'Arguin (FIBA)** is looking for a monitoring and evaluation officer based in Nouakchott (Mauritania). The candidate selected will be in charge of: (i) monitoring and evaluation, and capitalization of FIBA conservation programme; (ii) support to projects' managers and partners; (iii) support to the implementation of the programme's impact monitoring

Profile: university or technical training BAC+4 minimum in the field of environmental management (preferably related to marine/coastal ecosystem); 2-3 years experience in the field of international cooperation; knowledge of projects' formulation, management and monitoring and evaluation tools; a work experience with NGOs would be appreciated; interest for sustainable development and conservation; adaptation and autonomy capacity and capacity to work in team, capacity to write and make synthesis; knowledge of English (knowledge of Portuguese and Arabia will be appreciated). Fluent in French.

To apply for this position, send your CV with a handwritten cover letter in which you give the name of three reference persons and the date on which they are available no later than 8th September 2010 at fiba@lafiba.org on which you write "monitoring and evaluation application"

A comprehensive description of the position is available at www.lafiba.org

Training Opportunity

The Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association (WIOMSA) in collaboration with the Kenya Wildlife Services are organizing a Regional Training Course in MPA Management that will be held in Mombasa, Kenya from 22 November – 4 December 2010. Applications are invited from the qualified applicants all the countries in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) region. The course is funded by Regional Programme for the Sustainable Management of the Coastal Zones of the Countries of the Indian Ocean (ReCoMaP) and Sida. The course targets senior staff from the existing Marine Protected Areas in the WIO region as well as from organizations/programmes/projects that are involved in MPA management. If you would like to apply for this course, please ask for the application form to secretary@wiomsa.org or faxed to 255-24-2233852. The application deadline is 15 October 2010.

► The APAO's newsletter ◀

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