



# NAPA

## News from African Protected Areas

Nouvelles des Aires Protégées  
en Afrique

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### Edito

**Geoffroy MAUVAIS**  
PAPACO coordinator

### Common evil



The notion of “common goods” is well anchored, consciously or not, in the functioning of humanity. Although it remains difficult to define precisely, a common good is first and foremost an element that everyone would like to get before his/her neighbor does, hence its generally tragic fate, described in 1968 by Hardin, which we have already discussed several times in the NAPA.

Common goods have a characteristic: everyone wants them and, most importantly, everybody wants them before anyone else, which means that in the end, only a few users get them - usually the quickest ones or those best equipped to capture it.

Very recently (let’s say, on the scale of our planet’s history), men invented the notion of “common evil”. This notion is not precisely defined, but everyone will easily understand its meaning. The “common evil” is man-made, harmful for all, undesired by anyone.

The common evil has a characteristic: it benefits a few but is deleterious for all, and once created, no one wants it, particularly those who are least equipped to cope with it. So there is a thin line between common good and common evil; it all boils down to the question of who benefits and who suffers.

Common goods or evils can be global. The air we

breathe is our good, pollution is its corresponding evil and we must acknowledge that if this evil now affects everyone, its origin really only lies in the hands of a fraction of mankind.

Climate issues obviously belong to the same family. When the climate is good, we all enjoy it, naturally. When things go awry because the activity of a part of the human population, no one is spared the consequences. There is a little additional twist: climate change especially impacts those who have not yet had the time to contribute to the disruption.

That 15,000 scientists signed a fiery declaration at COP 23 in Bonn does not change anything: climate, as a common evil, responds to the same logic as the common good. No matter what the future brings, what matters is to get the most benefits now, even if it means destroying everything for that. After all, since we all have to die, let’s belong to the group of those who enjoyed themselves in the process.

Plastic is fantastic, as we all know. So fantastic, in fact, that everyone should reap its benefits, hence the addition of over 10 million tons of this material each year in the oceans can only fill us with joy (and the sea with plastic). A scientist even calculated that there will soon be more pieces of plastic floating in the oceans than fishes. Is this a good reason to make us stop throwing plastic everywhere? Certainly not, why would we bother if others don’t play by the same rules? This is the tragedy of the common evil...

The common evil can take regional colors. Chinese pharmacopoeia is an interesting example. It managed to create a black hole drawing in the

rhino horns of Africa (among other things!). Little do the consequences matter, especially since they are not visible. How many similar examples can we find when we look at Western mining companies exporting practices prohibited in their own countries, or palm oil forests feeding distant industries while turning a blind eye to the plea of local populations? The same logic always succeed, reap benefits quickly even if the cost is unbearable, especially if this cost is born by others (at least for now).

At the national or local levels, we can perhaps no longer speak of “common evil”, but rather of the usual bad governance of state goods? At another scale, the same consequences...

The Wikileaks and other Panama papers are shaking even the crowned heads. Perhaps it is time for the birth of a mechanism that publicly, transparently and systematically denounces the biggest contributors to the common evil?

Papaco is also on:



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
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Please also visit the IUCN-GPAP (IUCN global PA program) webpage and read the newsletter:  
<https://www.iucn.org/theme/protected-areas/our-work/newsletter>



Training on PA management and governance for terrestrial PA practitioners in Madagascar, in November 2017. The training was organized by WCS for the launch of the forum of PA managers in Madagascar (forum LAFA). More on: [madagascar.wcs.org](http://madagascar.wcs.org)

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Our MOOC are developed in cooperation with the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

**The next NAPA will present the results of our MOOC currently online**



## An Analysis of Non-State Protected Area Governance in Kenya

By Phil Franks, IIED

*IUCN-Papaco and IIED (International Institute for Environment and Development – [www.iied.org](http://www.iied.org)) have conducted a survey of non-State protected areas in Kenya where this type of governance is fairly common. This NAPA presents a summary of [the study](#) that can be downloaded in full on [www.papaco.org](http://www.papaco.org). These kinds of governance arrangements deserve to be better known as they may inspire governance evolution in other contexts leading to the creation or the reinforcement of PAs (and PAs systems) in Africa.*

This study focuses on governance of protected areas (PAs) in Kenya where authority for management and governance is largely with civil society and/or private sector actors. In governance terms we can call this the non-state PA sector and in most cases the resources of the PA are owned by non-state actors but this sector also includes PAs with resources legally owned by the state but largely under the authority of non-state actors – notably marine areas.



Landscape in Laikipia

The study focuses on a sample of eight PAs covering three of the most important landscapes/seascapes in Kenya, seven of which are registered as conservancies under a provision of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act of 2013 that seeks to better recognise the contribution of non-state actors to conservation in Kenya. In all but one of these cases the traditional systems of resource management have been at least partially replaced by government/donor-driven initiatives of the 70's, 80's and 90's – Group Ranches in the Rangelands and Beach Management Units on the

coast. Both have largely failed to deliver sustainable resource management let alone conservation. The more traditional arrangements that preceded Group Ranches and BMUs have largely disappeared and the context has changed so radically that there is no going back.

In all cases but one the governance arrangements aim to engage a range of different stakeholders who have a wide (and widening) range of interests. This requires a common property approach to resource management and governance fit for this purpose. This study explores the strengths, challenges, and enabling factors that are inherent to different governance types with the aim of supporting efforts to strengthen governance in the non-state PA sector.

In order to better understand the different governance types we have proposed an expansion of the classic framework of PA governance type to include a set of sub-types that are distinguished primarily by the relative influence of local communities, private sector and government actors in decision-making. Where local communities and private sector entities are the principal actors:

- Plain private governance
- Consultative private governance
- Private-led shared governance
- Joint shared governance
- Community-led shared governance
- Consultative community governance
- Plain community governance


Increasing  
influence of  
communities

At this point in time, Kenya has 411 PAs listed in the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA).

Since the Kenya Wildlife Conservation Association reports that there are currently 119 conservancies in Kenya and a good number of these are not yet included in the WDPA, it seems likely that the total number of PAs in Kenya currently exceeds 500. Because of the large number of forest reserves (234) and PAs under Kenya Wildlife Service, the state sector remains the largest part of this but most of the growth in the total number of PAs of recent years is coming from the non-state sector.

National policy is increasingly supportive of non-state PAs, notably the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act of 2013 (WCMA) which gives formal recognition to conservancies and also landscape and national level associations that can strengthen these conservancies and give them a stronger collective voice. That said, the all-

important regulations needed to operationalise WCMA have yet to be finalised and approved. WCMA covers the marine as well as terrestrial context. Although fisheries legislation does not yet have its own specific provision for PAs it is strongly supportive of community-based fisheries management and the 2016 Act adds conservation to the list of objectives of fisheries management.



Source: WCMC based on data from WDPA, AWF, KWS, NRT and Space for Giants.

#### Map of Kenyan PA by governance types

PAs are inherently Common Pool Resources (CPRs) – resources whose size and characteristics make it difficult, but not impossible, to exclude people from benefiting from use of its resources. Where the management and governance of a CPR requires addressing the objectives of more than one stakeholder a common property management regime is required. In her seminal work on CPRs Elinor Ostrom defined 8 key principles that are key to an effective common property management regime. In terms of approach to PA governance – PA governance type – the defining principle is the one relating to stakeholder participation in decision-making. Assuming that consultation counts as a form of (light) participation, all eight PAs in this study have a common property management

regime (CPMR). Secure resource tenure is a precondition for a successful and sustainable CPMR but, as illustrated by several case studies in this report, secure tenure does not necessarily mean ownership of the resource – secure use rights may also suffice.

This study explores the governance arrangements (structure and processes) of non-State PAs in Kenya through case studies of eight PAs covering community, private and shared governance types (see the [full report](#) for more details). Looking at three contrasting landscapes/seascape the aim was to study 2-3 PAs of each of the three major governance types (community, private, shared) although in reality it proved impossible to find private governance in two of the three areas:

- Northern rangelands (Laikipia, Isiolo and Samburu counties):
  - Borana ranch – consultative private governance
  - Kalama conservancy – consultative community governance
  - Ol Lentille conservancy – private-led shared governance
- Maasai Mara (Narok and Trans Mara counties)
  - Mara North conservancy – joint shared governance (private/community)
  - Oloisukut conservancy – consultative community governance
  - Olderkesi conservancy – community-led shared governance
- North coast (Lamu and Kilifi counties)
  - Pate conservancy – community led shared governance (community/government)
  - Kanamai Locally Managed Marine Area – community led shared governance (community/government)


Our analysis of strengths, challenges and enabling conditions includes issues that are specific to one particular governance sub-type as well as generic issues, as summarised in the following sections.

#### Consultative community governance (Kalama, Oloisukut)

Consultative means that the community seeks input from one or more other key stakeholders but doesn't necessarily have to take it into account in



its decision-making. In the two case studies of this governance type, the other key stakeholders in question are principally county government and the tourism partners. This is the strongest community-based governance type to be found in Kenya.



Source: WCMC using data from WDPA, AWF, KWS, NRT and Space for Giants.

#### Evolution of PA in Kenya (governance)

A key strength of this governance type is that community governance enables, more than any other type, a strong sense of community empowerment and collective commitment. This is based on the recognition that this governance type gives the community and the strong participatory processes as much as more tangible livelihood benefits.

Another strength of this governance types is the lack of ambiguity about who is in control. The community may agree to consult with other key stakeholders on certain issues but is not obliged to include representatives of other stakeholders in their decision-making processes. With respect to tourism and other forms of conservation-based business the downside is that business ventures may look more risky and thus investment may be more difficult to secure.

One other challenge that may affect community governance more than others is the vulnerability of the management system to local social pressure to bend the rules (eg regarding law enforcement and use of conservancy funds), especially where there is no clear distinction between conservancy management and governance. Although this may affect all governance types at some level, the multi-stakeholder governance structures of other governance types enable, to varying degrees, other

stakeholders to hold the community accountable. Of course it is possible to have strong downward accountability to the communities that the conservancies serve, for example through an AGM and other meetings, but in most communities this is not a traditional practice and there will be a need for substantial capacity building/empowerment on accountability and other good governance issues if community governance in modern Kenya is to be successful and sustainable.

#### Community-led shared governance (Olderkesi, Pate, Kanamai)

The three PAs in this category are very different both in context (marine and terrestrial) and in tenure (state vs community owned) and yet they have common strengths and challenges. A major strength of this governance type is that it enables strong community engagement and ownership and at the same time, a substantive role for government or the private sector. It is particularly relevant where the revenue generating potential of the resource base per member household is low since the community empowerment inherent in this governance type enables strong participatory processes that build community ownership and commitment despite relative low benefits.



Samburu area

Because this governance type is community led it makes sense to build on existing community institutions that are relatively strong – the Group Ranch in the case of Olderkesi and BMUs in the two marine areas. However neither Group Ranches nor BMUs have a strong track record of success in Kenya (with some notable exceptions). Therefore conservation efforts based on these existing institutions must still be prepared to invest heavily in support for management and governance of the Group Ranch/BMU at least until such time as viable alternatives appear. That said caution is needed regarding the tendency of external actors to want to create new institutions are needed. This is of particular concern where this leads to a two tier governance arrangement that could undermine the authority of the original governance structure and/or prove financial unsustainable.



### Joint shared governance (Mara North)


The major strength of joint shared governance is that it seeks to establish a genuine balance of power between the key actors such that contested decisions must be discussed in depth and at times negotiated. So long as transaction costs are carefully controlled this is likely to improve the effectiveness and equity of conservancy management, notably through better and fairer management of risks and the inevitable trade-offs between conservation and social outcomes.

Mara North which currently has two decision-making platforms more or less operating on the same level is in the process of turning this into a two tier system with the top tier being the Board of a joint company of the private sector tourism partners and the land owners, and the second tier being the existing Land Owners Committee and its sub-committees. In fact there is also a third tier in

the form of the four grazing committees at zonal level. While this appears complex, Mara North has the financial resources to make this multi-tiered approach work, and other conservancies in the Mara with similarly large revenues may in time adopt a similar model.

### Private-led shared governance (OI Lentille)

Prior to its ongoing transition to a joint shared governance the arrangement of parallel governance structures in reality gave the private sectors actors a somewhat stronger position partly by virtue of the fact that their company controlled the financial flows. The ongoing reform process reflects a recognition on both sides that this was increasingly problematic, as well as a sense that growing trust between the key actors presented a real win-win opportunity.




The governance arrangements at OI Lentille are somewhat similar to the situation at Mara North prior to its ongoing reform process. In this case there is just one private sector actor which controls all the financial flows and has full management authority within the conservancy. However while this may have been, in principle, quite acceptable to the participating communities in the early years, there is a risk of growing misalignment between the power relationship inherent in the existing private-led governance model as it has matured, and expectations of communities that have also evolved over time. This challenge is likely to be particularly an issue where the community owns the land and is therefore, ultimately, the more powerful actor. In other words, while this governance type may, from the perspective of private sector actors, be necessary for effective risk management it is unlikely to be a sustainable model for community owned conservancies.



## Plain private governance (Borana)

A major strength of this governance type is the relative simplicity of decision-making processes and simple and clear lines of accountability since authority is concentrated with one actor. However in the current context of Kenya a real challenge is the legitimacy of this model where the resource to which the authority relates is a large area of land with contested rights. Although the politics around this issue relate more to ownership than governance, it seems likely that the resentment that some feel towards this and similar conservancies might be reduced by a more consultative (but still private) governance arrangement and a more substantial benefit sharing programme. Enhancing equity as a way of countering resentment is as much about recognising and listening to peoples' concerns and fairness in sharing of benefits as it is about the actual volume of benefits.

Given the serious on-going political debate about legitimacy of this and similar conservancies, the potential for this governance type in Kenya would seem to be limited with the possibility that it could disappear within a generation. A shift to a more consultative approach might help to ease political pressures.



## Challenges - all governance types

- **Good governance and traditional norms:** Some notions of good governance may not align well with cultural norms, particularly in societies that have maintained strong traditional norms and values where decisions of the community are made by older men with little consultation with other community members let alone participation.
- **“Short-termism”:** This term – used by several informants in this study – simply refers to the fact that poor people understandably prioritise the benefits/costs of now and the near future (eg feeding the family) over future benefits/costs even though they well know that some strategies to generate immediate benefits are unsustainable. Establishing sustainable management and the necessary governance systems to oversee this is a long term

endeavour which frequently involves short term costs. In some cases community members may be willing and able to live with these short term costs but in other cases external actors must support mitigation measures to avoid, minimise and/or compensate such costs if investment in stronger natural resource management and governance is to succeed.

- **Elite capture of benefits:** The issue of benefits going disproportionately to a powerful elite in the community is a universal problem in conservation (and other sectors). This did not emerge much in case study interviews since, given time limitations, we inevitably were mostly talking to the elite. Effective stakeholder participation in developing benefit sharing policies, and downward accountability supported by transparent sharing of information on who is getting what are key to more equitable benefit sharing. While all governance types should be able to achieve high levels of transparency (especially in the modern age of SMS and social media) governance types that enable stronger community participation will tend to be better in terms of participation in policy development and downward accountability.
- **Financial viability:** Effective natural resource management and governance, however much based on voluntary inputs from the community, will have significant costs that must be covered. With respect to revenue earning potential there is a huge difference between the conservancies of the Mara and the other case study sites. In the Mara tourism revenue may be up to 100x more per capita than in some conservancies in Laikipia/Samburu. While quite a lot may be done to boost the revenues in these other areas we must acknowledge that major differences are inevitable and what works with high revenue conservancies may not be an option, or indeed appropriate, where revenues are much lower.

Not surprisingly, the conclusion of this study is that there is no one size fits all governance model – what is optimal for a given site will depend on a number key site-specific factors, in particular:

1. **Tenure.** Tenure security is a pre-condition for success of any governance type. The key issue that may well affect choice of governance type is the nature of the tenurial instrument (freehold, leasehold, concession, group vs individual etc) and the level of legitimacy that the specific

arrangements have in the eyes of local communities and politicians.



2. **Diversity of stakeholders, their objectives and other key concerns.** This will determine whether a common property management system is required, and, where it is, rules out governance sub-types that do not enable adequate stakeholder participation.
3. **Site-specific context: environmental, social, environmental, economic, institutional, political.** While the traditional natural resource management systems of Masai and Samburu pastoralists and artisanal fishers on the coast may not have been dependent on financial investment the context has dramatically changed in the last 50 years, notably the increase in numbers of people wholly or at least partially dependent on the natural resource base. While some PAs have no problem raising the necessary revenue themselves, others face a huge challenge in this respect that no governance intervention can solve. But this not saying that viable non-state PAs must be able to generate the revenue they need from PA-based enterprise or ultimately fail. There are several models for short-term and longer term financial assistance from external sources that can readily be justified in terms of social protection, development and environmental goals, and the fact that County governments in Marsabit and Samburu are now providing such support is an encouraging development.

Issues of human and financial resources, incentives to motivate key stakeholders to engage in governance and management and governance

quality are strongly inter-dependent. In many conservancies in Kenya work on governance has lagged behind work in the other two areas. This study hopefully makes a useful contribution to addressing this imbalance and strengthening the synergies between the three areas of work.

More on [www.papaco.org](http://www.papaco.org)  
[Link here](#)

**PANORAMA**  
 SOLUTIONS FOR A HEALTHY PLANET

### Club P.A.N.-Environmental education promotes chimpanzee conservation

More on: <http://panorama.solutions/en/solutions/club-p-a-n-environmental-education-promotes-chimpanzee-conservation>

Education is a long-term priority for the conservation of chimpanzees and other wildlife. In 2007, the Max Planck Institute's conservation group, together with Wildlife Conservation Society, created Club P.A.N. for schools in West Africa. The project's aim is to discourage children living near wild chimpanzee habitats from consuming bush-meat and to enable them to be pro-active in biodiversity conservation. Club P.A.N. is now active in 15 schools around the Taï National Park in Côte d'Ivoire and 7 schools in Guinea.



Evaluation results from past school-years found that participation in Club P.A.N. significantly increased environmental knowledge and positively influenced attitudes towards nature. Micro-projects



were successfully established in Club P.A.N. schools to teach children farming techniques of domesticated animals (fish, snails, goats, chicken) as alternative protein sources compared to bush-meat hunting.

## More info on PANORAMA

### IUCN Green List process for Protected Areas in Ivory Coast

By Youssouph Diedhiou, IUCN-Papaco

In May 2017, the Papaco kicked off the Green List (GL) process in Ivory Coast in partnership with the OIPR (Ivorian Office of Natural Parks and Reserves), with the support of the French Development Agency (AFD) and the African World Heritage Fund (AWHF). Upon proposal of OIPR's management director, Taï and Comoé National Parks are the first protected areas to be candidates for the IUCN Green List of protected areas. Two important steps of the GL project have already been implemented:

#### 1 - Consulting and informing stakeholders.

Through various encounters, Papaco introduced the importance of the GL and how it is implemented to the different conservation stakeholders in Ivory Coast. The following institutions were targeted: OIPR, the Foundation for Parks and Reserves, research centres, NGOs and associations of local communities living around Taï and Comoé National Parks.



Presentation of the GL to partners in Côte d'Ivoire

#### 2 - Creation of the Green List expert panel

Ivory Coast's Green List expert panel is made of seven Ivorian protected area management specialists. The group received training from an

external consultant in Central and West Africa (consultant working for ASI). The role of the expert panel is to assess GL candidates before transferring applications to an external reviewer, and then to the IUCN panel for a final decision.

A roadmap of this implementation process was drawn up, and its progress will be presented in NAPAs to come. Other African countries are expected to join the process in 2018...



## Job Offers

### Cameroon: finance director

The Finance Director reports to the WCS Cameroon Country Director, with a dotted-line report to the Comptroller in New York and works closely with the WCS Sudano-Sahel Region Business Manager. The Finance Director is based in Yaounde, Cameroon and undertakes regular work travel to various WCS project sites in the country. This position is responsible for management of the financial systems, reporting to New York office and donors, country budgetary reporting and controls, monitoring and compliance of internal controls, conduct/coordinate operation reviews of project sites, cash management. Managing a growing team currently made up of five staff.

Responsibilities will include:

- Financial management and accounting for the WCS Cameroon Program (tracking and projecting spending by projects and funding agencies, accounting, internal project audits).
- Staff administration- establishing staff contracts, worker's compensation and medical benefits, vacation and work schedules in adherence with country program guidelines and following the national labor laws.
- Ensure that all projects/activities in the country program are respecting national legislation regarding customs regulations, labor rights, taxes, benefits, etc.
- Ensure all project financial activities are in compliance with donor requirements.
- Work with project managers/directors to generate financial reports and donor reports.
- Work with project managers/directors and the WCS-NY office to produce budget proposals for potential donors.
- Assure timely accounting and reporting on all country project expenditures
- Monitor overall budget management with regular updates on expenditures and availability of funds to NY and the project managers/directors and administrators.
- Oversee coordination of logistics at the country office and between the country office and the projects.
- Monitor bank transfers, banking activities, advances and expenditures in coordination with WCS-NY.
- Assist in recruiting, training, and managing of administrative staff for the country office.
- Review project budget proposals for the annual budget proposal submission to WCS-NY.

- Financial management of project infrastructure, i.e. leases/rent, insurance policies, registration (vehicles, housing, office, boats, etc)
- Management of in-country revenue sources and receivables.
- Oversee expatriate administration and logistics.

Interested candidates should apply by sending an application letter and CV together with the names and contact information of three references to the addresses below no later than December 31, 2017. Please include "Cameroon Finance Director" in the subject line of your email. Send to: [africaapplications@wcs.org](mailto:africaapplications@wcs.org) and [rfotso@wcs.org](mailto:rfotso@wcs.org).

Candidates must also apply online via the WCS career portal by searching job title at: <http://www.wcs.org/about-us/careers>.

### **Kenya: regional business manager, sudano-sahel region**

Reports to the Regional Director of Sudano-Sahel Region. Secondary report to the Deputy Director of Finance & Administration of the Africa Program. This position will involve regular travel to WCS Country Offices within the region (including Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Ethiopia)) approximately 30% of time. It is preferred that the position is based out of the WCS office in Nairobi, Kenya.

The main purpose of this role will be to oversee the budget and finances of the region, and to provide direct support to the Regional Director in managing the operations of the Regional Program. The Regional Business Manager will continually assess and document the financial health of the Regional Program, develop both short and long term financial plans for the Region, and work with the Regional Director and associated Country Program staff on grant management and fundraising. S/he regularly provides reports for management in the region and headquarters.

Primary responsibilities:

- Financial Management and Planning: Ensure Regional Director has the financial information they require to manage and fundraise for the Region; Provide monthly key performance indicators for each country and all multi-country grants; Work with Regional Controller to resolve any issues with finances in the Region; Annual presentation of short and long term financial plans for each country with detailed variance analysis on prior plans;

Report regularly to headquarters about the financial state of the Region.

- Budget Leadership: Manage and maintain the Regional Program budget; Lead the annual WCS budgeting process for all countries in the Region; Responsible for working with Country Finance teams to understand and report on full program costs; Serve as the budget lead for regional grants; Review country budget adjustments, budget to actual reports, and ensure regular and timely budget updates.

- Proposal Review: Working in coordination with NY grant departments, contribute to the development of and approve all proposal budgets from the Region – ensure budgets are covering costs and are contributing to strengthening the Regional Program; ensure budgets are in line with long-term financial plan for the Region; ensure budgets are developed in compliance with WCS policies and undergo appropriate reviews.

- Grant Management: Ensure regional grant administration is on track; Coordinate preparation of financial reports for regional grants; Review and approve grant financial reports prepared by Country Programs; Support Country Programs in understanding WCS grant management processes, systems, tools and donor compliance requirements.

- People Management: Work with Regional Director to manage regional staffing; Oversee HR issues in the Region; Support the recruitment and training of grant/finance/administration staff as needed.

- Fund Raising: Work with the Regional Director and Country Directors in the region to design, develop and implement fundraising strategy for the region.

- Perform other duties as determined by the Regional Director.

Interested candidates should apply by sending an application letter and CV together with the names and contact information of three references to the addresses below not later than December 31, 2017. Please include "Sudano Sahel Business Manager" in the subject line of your email. Send to: [sclark@wcs.org](mailto:sclark@wcs.org) and [pelkan@wcs.org](mailto:pelkan@wcs.org).

Candidates must also apply online via the WCS career portal by searching job title at: <http://www.wcs.org/about-us/careers>.

### **NAPA – CONTACTS**

**www.papaco.org and www.iucn.org**

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Program on African Protected Areas & Conservation  
 PAPACO - Program Officer  
 PAPACO – Program Officer

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