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Editorial



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PAPACO COORDINATOR

CHANGING ONESELF BEFORE CHANGING THE WORLD

Throughout the last few months of 2022, multiple international summits on various environmental topics collided: climate change, biodiversity, CITES, Ramsar, etc.

On the one -positive- hand, this outburst of activity shows public debate around environmental issues is alive and well. On the other, it leads us to question their purpose, considering that most environmental indicators are shifting to red.

Questioning the relevance of these ultra-mediatized summits, that take place so frequently and discuss key issues but often don't lead to much action, is legitimate if we are to give them meaning. It's a matter of common sense, and not merely a sign of pessimism or cynicism as we often hear.

When such questioning doesn't occur, or when answers are vague, senseless or prefabricated, the general public gets the impression that these international arenas are not going to tackle the issues they were designed to deal with.

For a long time, this vague feeling circulated among specialists and experts. Determined to be critical, some of them exhausted our ears by repeatedly voicing their anxiety, while others - unwisely optimistic - lost all credibility by defending an unrealistic and idealized vision of the world. Overall, it was no big deal, and the world was able to calmly go through one COP after the other and stack them away, as our readers do with the NAPA.

But over the past few years, and especially in 2022, something changed. The street took up these doubts, the greater public started looking into the results (or lack thereof) of various summits, and speaking out - for better or worse - on social media, in the media, inside homes, NGOs and political groups...

Fear has brewed out of this loud racket. Fear that the system we built in good faith over the past 50 years, and especially after 1992, will not work. That these talks, these commitments, these handshakes are just empty

words followed by no action, while the house is on fire.

The environmental issues that we humans have created are humongous and will not be solved through successive conferences, that's a fact. But these conferences are the only way we have found to sit, talk, decide, and maybe - one day - act together. If those don't work, there is nothing left, at least on a global scale. And this abysmal void generates anxiety, a feeling that has swept across almost an entire generation, drenched in fear for tomorrow and confusion about today's inaction.

This anxiety translates into all the radical actions we observe today - the global protests, the sometimes violent agitation of some groups, and desperate individual actions. This situation is extremely problematic because desperation leads to chaos, and chaos will not preserve nature - quite the opposite.

Those who convene and take part in these conferences therefore bear an immense responsibility. We need to re-establish trust in these forums, and to show - through action - why they are important, essential, and how they may address the current challenges.

This NAPA presents a recently published socio-anthropology article on the "conflicts of interests, self-censorship and success stories" plaguing the world of development - including conservation. It's a topic we already discussed several times (NAPA 126, 129, 135 and 153), but this article is a strong summary of the shortcomings of the development world, dominated by "self-congratulation, auto-regulation, positive discourses, beautiful success stories, the promotion of interventionism and doublespeak." Importantly, it also sheds light on some of its failures.

We should all read this article, and following that, question our own behavior and the way these ingrained biases may affect our decisions (or lack thereof). And re-read it frequently. If you really believe none of this relates to you, don't change anything and nothing will change! Else, get involved and make 2023 the year that trust in words, our words, will be restored. A beautiful year of self-improvement lies ahead! ●

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Next session coming up. You will be able to access the courses again starting January 23rd. All grades have been reset and exams were changed. You can therefore try the exams again if you failed or did not finish in the past.

Next session: 23 January to 18 June 2023

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


ESSENTIALS

What are they? They are short courses geared to a specific profile of protected area conservation actors.

Four options are possible: Rangers, Managers (involved in Research R or in Law enforcement L) and Leaders.

The Essentials are open throughout the year. All exams were reset on December 14th 2022. You can therefore try to pass them again if you failed in the past.



RANGER ESSENTIAL

For protected area (PA) professionals who apply decisions and ensure the implementation of activities inside the PA.



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For protected area professionals who need to plan, manage and assess the work carried out by field agents.

➔ **MANAGER LAW** focuses on law enforcement and the valorisation of the PA and its natural resources.



➔ **MANAGER RESEARCH** focuses on research activities, monitoring-evaluation and ecological monitoring.



LEADER ESSENTIAL

For actors who are influencing the protected area context at a larger scale, without necessarily working directly inside a protected area.

MOOC-CONSERVATION.ORG FIGURES

SOME FIGURES AROUND THE SECOND SESSION OF 2022

WHERE IS PARTICIPATION AT? This second session of 2022 ended with nearly 9,667 new registrations. This brings us just under the 100,000 we were targeting, with a total of 99,209 enrolments since we started the MOOCs in 2015! We will certainly reach the 100,000 this month, so we'll need a new goal...

STABILITY IN THE NUMBER OF ATTESTATIONS (AKA SUCCESSFUL STUDENTS). Participation was excellent, what about attestations? Last session we were beating a record with 12% attestations granted. This session we're back to our usual figure of 8%. Keep in mind, however, that in numbers, this is still more than last session where participation was lower.

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION. The +9,000 students enrolled this session come from over 120 countries around the world with the following on top: 1 Cameroon (for the second time in a row), 2 Côte d'Ivoire, 3 DRC, 4 Madagascar, 5 Morocco (for the first time in the top 10), 6 Senegal, 7 Benin, 8 Burkina Faso, 9 France and 10 Guinea. Participation in each country on this list was between 200 and 1,000 learners.

NEW PARTICIPANTS THIS SESSION

9,667

TOTAL PARTICIPATION SINCE 2015

99,209



8,546 ATTESTATIONS* GRANTED
SINCE 2015

*To receive an attestation of success, one must have obtained an average score of 75% or more at the exams off a MOOC. •

MOOC CONSERVATION HUBS

If you'd like to join a MOOC Conservation hub in your city, have a look at the full list of ambassadors [here](#) and contact the ambassador in charge. If you don't see your city or country represented, [click here](#) to submit your application to become ambassador.

THE DEVELOPMENT WORLD

THE DEVELOPMENT WORLD: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AT ALL LEVELS

By: Valéry Ridde* and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan**

In: Revue Internationale des Etudes du Developpement – n°249 2022-2 – Editions de la Sorbonne, posted on [The Development World: Conflicts of Interest at All Levels \(openedition.org\)](https://www.openedition.org)

INTRODUCTION

Addressing the issue of conflicts of interest in the South brings to mind the pharmaceutical industry or mining companies in Africa. There is extensive scientific literature on how these companies elicit favourable evaluations (Campbell & Dufort, 2016; Lachenal, 2014; Ouvrier et al., 2015).

Social engineering for development (Olivier de Sardan, 2021) is also subject to countless conflicts of interest, often of a different nature. While existing literature mentions some aspects of conflicts of interest, such as consultancy (Olivier de Sardan, 2011), development experts (Jampy, 2012; Laporte, 2015), per-diems, or Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) (Pérouse de Montclos, 2012; Ridde, 2016), these remain the exceptions. Conflicts of

interest seem to fall under what Geissler (2013) called, concerning public health, “public secrets.”

To address this issue, we need to define what we mean by “conflict of interest.” Conflicts of interest are commonly associated with the links that experts, who are supposed to independently evaluate an object (a public policy, an intervention, a research or a product), have with private for-profit firms involved in the issue.

In this paper, we intend to broaden this understanding in two dimensions. On the one hand, it is not mainly private for-profit firms that are at the origin of conflicts of interest in the development world, but international institutions, public agencies, states, and NGOs, most of which are not-for profit and all of which intend to work to improve the living conditions of vulnerable populations (Li, 2007). On the other hand, we want to go beyond the world of experts: development aid, which in many ways functions

as a special kind of “rent,” generates conflicts of interest from the top to the bottom of the development chain, including among the final beneficiaries.

Our approach, therefore, requires an original and inclusive definition. Conflict of interest happens when an actor involved at any level in social engineering for development and humanitarian aid feels it necessary to express views that contradict his or her perceptions or knowledge, to withhold the criticism that he or she would be willing to express, or to ignore the problems that an intervention faces.

When actors or organisations do not make criticisms or reject without debate those that are made, when they systematically justify their practices, and do not accept that they are questioned, this is a conflict of interest – whether the motives are financial, symbolic, or institutional. A conflict of interest, in this broad meaning, implies deafness to the criticisms of others, as well as self-censorship towards one’s own criticisms, because any public expression of criticism is perceived as a threat to one’s position in the development business.

The professional world of development (the “developmentist configuration”) is an arena in which everyone’s voice is strongly constrained by the interests of all the actors involved in keeping their reticence, their doubts, their reservations, and their criticisms quiet. It is a world where self-congratulation, self-regulation, laudatory discourse, the promotion of interventions, and the use of stereotypical language is prevalent.

There are many actors involved in a conflict of interest. They come from very disparate institutions or social backgrounds, are subject to very different constraints, and are at very different levels of power. The conflicts

of interest that dissuade them from raising issues or expressing criticism are therefore not all of the same nature. Nevertheless, they all follow a common logic: if development projects are to be extended, it is better to demonstrate their benefits and communicate their successes than to point out their weaknesses and draw attention to their failures. Conflicts of interests are not only individual, although they sometimes are (e.g. career management, seeking a promotion, search for consultancy, etc.), but also institutional (e.g. to maintain the image of a development agency, to obtain funding for an NGO, to communicate on the successes of an administration, to show donors that their money is being well used, etc.).

To analyse the reluctance to criticism, which is typical of the development world, we will consider three different levels. Firstly, we will look at evaluations of interventions, which pose specific problems, insofar as conflicts of interest result in evaluators minimising or ignoring difficulties and problems in their reports. In this article, we take a broad view of the evaluation of interventions which, in addition to a value judgement on an intervention, as proposed by Patton (1997), also include monitoring. We will then look at the actors who have an operational role in the implementation process of interventions: NGO agents, on the one hand, and civil servants in the South, on the other. Faced with the daily implementation gaps between the intervention “on the paper” and “on the ground,” they often act as if these gaps do not exist and focus solely on achieving the expected objectives while ignoring the unexpected effects. We conclude by analysing why the populations targeted by the programmes do not express their disagreements and frustrations either.

In conclusion, we will reflect on some possible options for opening up the world of development to more criticism, which seems indispensable.

Researchers and stakeholders have numerous criticisms (Hutchinson, 2019), but public debates on conflicts of interest are rare. Accepting criticism and taking it into account is indeed a necessary step if we want to improve the quality of the services offered to populations, promote intervention mechanisms that are better adapted to local contexts and get out of the uninterrupted flow of standardised “travelling models” (Gautier et al., 2018; Olivier de Sardan, 2021). How can we access a reality that

is very different from the official stories? And how can we make this reality heard by the development institutions’ leaders and their donors? Our aim is not to condemn development institutions, but to enable them to improve their actions towards local populations by considering the biases and deviations that their interventions encounter on the ground.

A final clarification is in order. The empirical material we will mobilise comes from our own experience of some twenty years of involvement and research concerning interventions promoted by development institutions. The cases on which we will draw are not exceptional but, on the contrary, are typical of situations encountered in the development world. Of course, there are also exceptions, and we have observed organisations or actors who are open to criticism. In the future, it would be essential to organise (and fund) a program of conceptual and empirical research to analyse in depth, and with a multiple case study approach, situations that we will only explore briefly here. Our article should be understood more as a reflexive analysis based on our professional experiences (Tremblay & Parent, 2014) in order to draw attention to a relatively underestimated problem rather than the product of a systematic comparative research.

1. THE EVALUATORS

In the general field of programme evaluation, conflicts of interest were addressed a long time ago by Scheirer (1978), who mentioned the cognitive mechanisms that can lead evaluators to favour the positive effects of interventions. She cited a review of the literature from 1969-1973 showing that “evaluators who were organizationally affiliated with the program being evaluated were much more likely to report program success (58%) than were non-affiliated researchers (14%).” These phenomena were first largely ignored when it comes to evaluations of development programmes in Africa. Subsequently, while it is true that most development organisations have long outsourced evaluation to avoid (in principle) these biases, the fact that they pay consultants to evaluate the interventions they fund poses particular challenges.

In the field of evaluation, and in particular in the development field, there is a dichotomy between internal and external evaluation. Internally, the monitoring and evaluation of interventions by employees of the

organisation is common practice to monitor activities and draw lessons (capitalisation), and sometimes to produce reports on the effectiveness of these interventions, even if the methods used do not always allow it. The links of interest are obvious and clear, since the evaluation is carried out by employees of the organisation being evaluated. Nevertheless, this is not in itself a “bad practice” and this is sometimes recommended by action research, participatory evaluation, or developmental evaluation approaches (Patton, 2010).

As for external evaluations, which are supposed to be independent and therefore more “objective”, they are very generally carried out by consultants (individually or on behalf of consultancy firms) who are constantly looking for contracts. It is in their interest to be gentle with their mandating institutions, especially when they are a major development agency. The implicit pressure to stop using consultants who are too critical hangs over their shoulders. A consultant’s long-term privileged relationship with the same donor or development operator, to whom he or she becomes *de facto* indebted, is almost never declared. Beyond the connivance that can exist between consultants and donors, the structural framework of the consultation does not allow for an in-depth and therefore critical investigation. The consultants have very little time to carry out their evaluations. Although they may use secondary databases, they have a tight budget that does not allow them to stay in the field for long. They work on the basis of terms of reference and specifications imposed by the sponsors, who dictate what should be studied and how. There is little room for manoeuvre on these terms. They must follow these instructions or risk not being selected or paid.

Finally, it sometimes happens that the sponsors of evaluations censor passages in consultants’ reports that are not to their liking. The practice of restitution of evaluations to those responsible for the intervention (feedback), which is in itself positive, often becomes an opportunity to question the inconvenient results or critical formulations, sometimes with the explicit threat of the report not being “validated” (which implies no payment). These forms of censorship are almost systematically accepted by the consultants, who themselves often come to anticipate them and practice self-censorship.

These issues have long been known to evaluation

researchers (Hutchinson, 2019). Although there are attempts to avoid these consultancy-specific biases with utilization-focused and real world evaluation (Patton, 1997; Bamberger et al., 2006), putting these principles into practice is more difficult than formulating them in academic books. Evaluation practice in Africa, for example, is often far from these principles (Ridde et al., 2016).

The opposition between internal and external evaluation is relative. External evaluations are far from independent. In extreme cases, conflicts of interest in evaluation can be directly financial. Sometimes forms of direct bribery can occur. In some countries, and with some institutions, kickbacks from consultants to the person commissioning a study are the norm (10-20% of the contract). Anyone who does not play along is excluded from the contract. Such practices have often been reported to us, including in some UN organisations and African governments. They are not the exclusive preserve of African consultants and consultancy firms; some European or North American consultancy firms are known for participating in them. Another frequent practice is to entrust highly profitable studies to protégés or political friends, resulting in rushed investigations and botched reports, which often are not disseminated or accessible.

Finally, we should mention the case of researchers who do consultancy work. Researchers have statutory and financial independence that consultants do not have, because their salary does not depend on the donors or implementers even if they are dependent on external funding for developing research programmes, which is becoming more the norm than the exception and deserves to be analysed in greater depth. Certain disciplines (medicine, public health, economics, for example) frequently engage in consultancy activities. In Africa, whatever the discipline, academics widely practice consultancy, which hinders the development of quality independent research by blurring the boundaries (Olivier de Sardan, 2011). Researchers in the South, lacking the resources of their colleagues in the North, are often more vulnerable to pressure from sponsors.

There are indeed cases where development agencies turn to research laboratories, and not to consultants, to conduct studies on intervention contexts and even on their programmes. However, these agencies often

try to deal with research institutions as they do with consultants, and to retain direct control over the results, particularly concerning the publication of the latter, which is subject to drastic conditions, even though the research will have been paid, like the intervention, by public funds. In other words, research based on funding granted by development institutions and investigating social engineering interventions of the latter is more often than not subjected by these institutions to the same subjugating rules as consultancy, with no regard for the specificity of research. Researchers are often subject, like consultants, to attempts at censorship if their results are not acceptable (Olivier de Sardan, 2011; Storeng et al., 2019).

2. THE NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

NGOs generally do not have their own funds. They depend on donor funding, which subcontracts the implementation of intervention programmes and imposes various budget and content constraints. Therefore, NGOs, both in the North and the South, are vulnerable to donor funding and influences. They need to have “good results” in order to be awarded new contracts.

It is not easy to talk about NGOs in general terms (Siméant & Dauvin, 2004). Their profiles and modes of operation range from genuine civil society organisations driven by a desire for social change and carried by socially committed actors; to empty shells taking the name of NGO to capture resources and benefit from tax preferences; to powerful multinational NGOs operating in many countries. Sometimes an NGO is even a front for a de facto consultancy firm, carrying out consultations and evaluations. NGOs have a lot to lose if their failures are revealed publicly (Pérouse de Montclos, 2012; Ridde, 2016). Thus, the “success cartel,” based on the self-celebration of programmes, is not limited to donors alone (Rajkotia, 2018) but extends to NGOs as well.

NGOs in the North are increasingly becoming operators funded by official development assistance. We also see more and more NGO members becoming employees of their former donors. Southern NGOs are increasingly being created to capture the “development rent” (they often feel they only get the crumbs compared to Northern NGOs). The Southern NGO, to which a Northern NGO has subcontracted the fieldwork, must show that they

are effective and achieve the expected objectives. The Northern NGO, which has received funding from a development agency, must show its donors that the implementation is a success.

As for the field workers of Southern NGOs, who are often aware of the “bypasses” used by the populations in the face of the programmes intended for them, they rarely mention them to their superiors. It is as if, in the professional context of the NGO, only a smooth and positive discourse was acceptable and that it was necessary to look away from aspects of reality that did not conform to the official language of the NGO.

3. PUBLIC SERVICES

For most ministries in most African countries, development aid funds are a precious and sought-after source of income necessary for the functioning of the services. They also provide many personal benefits (formal or informal) to staff. They must show that aid funds are well used and produce the expected results, whatever the reality.

The public services, both at the level of the ministries in the capital and at the level of the decentralised services in the interior of the country, are in a deep and constant state of shortage. Civil servants do not have the means to carry out their missions normally. There is a shortage of infrastructure and equipment, a shortage of means of operation and travel, and low salaries. This situation contrasts with the luxury of donor-funded “projects” with their 4x4 vehicles, air-conditioned offices, and high salaries. The best civil servants have left the civil service to work in development institutions, leaving their colleagues in the ministries destitute and bitter. The high level of corruption in many countries has one of its roots in this situation (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan, 2006). When aid resources arrive, not only does the state service that benefits from them finally have some means at its disposal, but everyone wants to have “their share”: allowances, “topping-ups,” access to vehicles, petrol vouchers, and per-diems on the formal level; and hidden commissions on markets, false missions, and embezzlement on the informal level. The recent Ebola and COVID-19 pandemics and their associated international aid packages have only confirmed these processes, which have led to conflicts of interest at two levels.

On the one hand, there is an almost systematic upstream approval of all programmes proposed by donors, regardless of their real relevance, and even when they seem unrealistic or doomed to failure. “On a given horse you don’t look at the teeth”: this proverb, often quoted by Niger actors working in development institutions, was used as the title of a study on their perceptions of aid (Lavigne Delville & Abdelkader, 2010). You have to show that you are a “good student,” and hide the problems, difficulties, and failures. The objective is to obtain a renewal of the programme or new aid and to benefit from a favourable opinion among donors. The figures produced systematically show that the beneficiary populations are satisfied (even when discontent prevails on the ground) and that the planned activities have been carried out (even if in a summary manner or with a deplorable quality). Planned quantitative indicators must be achieved, and implementation or disbursement rates must be respected.

One must constantly please the donors, show them that their money is well spent and their programmes are effective, provide good statistics, and tell nice success stories. Reservations, objections, and criticisms are unwelcome, even if they are well-founded. This often applies to all types of supervision. Anything that threatens this laudatory narrative must be kept quiet. When researchers make realistic diagnoses, without the usual complacency and self-censorship, ministries perceive them as threats, and consider the truths they uncover as attacks or slander (Paul et al., 2018).

4. BENEFICIARY POPULATIONS

The “good student” behaviour is also widespread among the beneficiary populations. The “aid rent” reaches every village, and the word “project” is applied in all local and national languages to any type of development or humanitarian intervention funded by Northern institutions. Trying to get donors to take an interest in a village, a canton, or a region is now a common strategy of local elites, to which many “development brokers” contribute (Bierschenk et al., 2000).

In order to obtain and renew funding, it is essential to present a good image of the community and to put on a good show. Potential beneficiaries must therefore hide the conflicts, rivalries, accusations, suspicions, nuisances, delinquency or incivilities that punctuate daily life in the

countryside and urban neighbourhoods in Africa (as elsewhere). A positive, sometimes idyllic, narrative must be produced for foreign partners. This narrative is constantly being transferred, sometimes insidiously, sometimes cynically, sometimes naively, into the data of numerous studies and research projects. The “good answers” must be given to interviewers passing questionnaires on the run (with their famous Likert scales, whose validity is questionable in this context; cf. Scott et al., 2019).

It is not surprising that aid recipients thank donors profusely, singing about the benefits they have received while keeping their reservations and criticisms to themselves. Sometimes even those who have been excluded, wrongly according to them, do not dare to publicly express their frustration and contradict the praise. Many surveys, statistics, evaluations, reports, and publications incorporate significant biases from the voices of local communities or elites, who tend to provide a “skewed” picture of reality, and hold opinions or make statements designed to appeal to development institutions.

5. POSITIVE EXCEPTIONS

Of course, not all organisations systematically succumb to conflicts of interest. There are development actors who accept criticism and the highlighting of difficulties, knowing that this is the only way to improve and reform interventions. There are examples that show that it is possible to conduct intervention research transparently, without censorship or self-censorship. Nevertheless, to our knowledge and experience, these positive attitudes remain exceptions. Moreover, they are dependent on individuals, and are never sufficiently institutionalised in the form of a deliberate and explicit policy as they should be.

CONCLUSION

We do not have a magic solution, but we nevertheless propose some ways to address conflicts of interest in the development world. We also suggest that research should be organised to better understand these processes, their determinants, and their impacts, as well as to document exceptions (i.e cases where critics are seen as positively helping to improve interventions).

The first level is advocacy, training, and argumentation. It is a matter of convincing all the actors in the developmental configuration of the need to look difficulties in the face, take unexpected effects into account, and accept empirically-based criticism as indispensable conditions for improving social engineering interventions. There must be an attempt to counteract the self-congratulation and culture of celebrating success that dominates among development professionals (Rajkotia, 2018). The obsession with positive results based on quantitative indicators and celebrated by uplifting stories must be balanced by a culture of truthfulness among both donors and development practitioners. More specifically, a “culture of rigorous diagnosis” must be put in place.

A second level focuses on the mechanisms that can help to put this culture of rigorous diagnosis into practice.

First of all, donors, who are the masters of the rules of the game, should give themselves and the development operators instructions to be open to criticism. Any intervention should be subject to independent diagnosis during its implementation to correct its shortcomings and better adapt to local realities (Storeng et al., 2019). The adaptation of projects to local contexts and especially pragmatic contexts (Olivier de Sardan, 2021), their responsiveness to implementation gaps, and their ability to take into account the strategies of stakeholders on the ground are more important for the success of an intervention than the mechanical following of a roadmap or the formal respect of indicators planned in offices in Washington, Geneva or Dakar (Morell, 2010; Olivier de Sardan et al., 2017; Ridde et al., 2007). It requires the use of mixed methods (Bujold et al., 2018) and, therefore, a greater emphasis on qualitative methods, which can better identify field actors’ perceptions and reactions and document the unexpected effects of any intervention.

There is also a need to ensure transparency of the results of evaluations and research. The publication of all reports, or their free access on the Internet, must become the rule. Of course, actors of the institutions which have been the subject of these evaluations and research must also have a right of reply, and debates based on rigorous

and transparent arguments should be encouraged. All development organisations, not just academic ones, should have charters specifying what a relationship of interest is, how to declare and account for it, and how to ensure the independence of intervention research.

Finally, one avenue to explore would be for countries (and international agencies) providing official development assistance to systematically set aside a fund for intervention research (i.e. 10% of all funded interventions). This sum would not be managed by the institutions financing the interventions (and their appointed evaluators) but by international committees of experts (chosen on their competence) who would select the research proposals submitted by international research teams (including, of course, from the beneficiary country).

The purpose of our proposals is to stimulate a debate, which is currently lacking, on the role that independent, rigorous, and non-complacent analyses of the interventions of development institutions should have. The conflicts of interest (in the broadest sense of the term) that we have described, regardless of the actors involved, mask the limitations, difficulties, bypasses, errors, dissatisfactions, and misunderstandings that are part of any development programme. This blindness is a major cause of the repeated failures of the development world.

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• [Read the full article on The Development World: Conflicts of Interest at All Levels \(openedition.org\)](#)

YOUTH-CONSERVATION.ORG: SOME FIGURES



It has been three months since youth-conservation.org was launched. This platform is dedicated to raising awareness on conservation matters among the youth ages 10 to 17 years old. We want to see them realise how important it is to act for the planet. Let's have a quick look at how far we've come.

2500 people have visited the website.

Where are they? 1 in Benin, 2 in France, 3 in Switzerland, 4 in the Congo Republic, 5 in Burkina Faso, 6 in the DRC, 7 in Cameroon, 8 in Senegal, 9 in Côte d'Ivoire. 10 in South Africa.

The geographical target seems to have been met. our goal however is not merely to have many visitors, but for the youth to really use this tool. In the Congo, Péthuelle tells us that in one highschool, students use youth-conservation.org like an encyclopedia. They refer to it and use it to find answers. There is no right or wrong way to use the website. Send us your stories, how your classes use youth-conservation.org.



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